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Review of Presidential Speechwriting: From the
New Deal to the Reagan Revolution and
Beyond by Kurt Ritter and Martin J. Medhurst
Steven R. Goldzwig: Marquette University
Kurt Ritter and Martin J. Medhurst, eds., Presidential Speechwriting: From the New Deal to the Reagan
Revolution and Beyond (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2003), 248 pp. $39.95.
In his introduction, “Presidential Speechwriting: Ten Myths that Plague Modern Scholarship,” Martin J.
Medhurst points to the importance of the modern presidential speechwriter. In debunking some common myths
about presidential speechwriting, Medhurst makes it clear that this topic is often misunderstood and
underappreciated. Each of the selected myths receives an interesting, if truncated, discussion and defense. The
overall effect is to invite the reader into an important dialogue that continues throughout the book.
In chapter one, “Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Rhetorical Politics and Rhetorical Rhetorics,” Halford Ryan argues
that in the case of FDR, traditional assumptions about the speechwriting process must be reconfigured. Rather
than being a mere “handmaiden of statecraft,” speechwriting was a critical factor in how policy was fashioned.
In Ryan's words, “The success of FDR's presidential rhetoric was his ability to invent a policy rhetorically for its
eventual acceptance politically” (22). For his case study, Ryan describes Roosevelt's use of metaphor. In the
main, he argues that when the metaphors failed or were largely absent, FDR's policies were unsuccessful, and

when the metaphors worked, the policies they represented flourished. Ryan clearly and forcefully implicates the
role of rhetoric in effective and ineffective public policy decision making processes and products. The rhetoric‐
policy relationships posited in Ryan's case study provide fertile ground for the future investigation of this topic.
In chapter two, “Harry S. Truman: From Whistle‐Stops to the Halls of Congress,” Diana B. Carlin employs some
judicious archival research to plumb the speechwriting apparatus of the Truman administration. Carlin usefully
describes the Truman speechwriting system, the speechwriters' origins, and their principal roles within the
speechwriting process. Professor Carlin's stellar research uncovers the fact that Truman had a remarkable
speechwriting team and that the president was adroit enough to take full advantage of it. The descriptions
provided evoke a time when there was a bit less bureaucracy attached to the speechwriting process (and
therefore more direct access to the president), while simultaneously uncovering a finely‐tuned, proactive
system in place to support this particular president. Carlin makes a compelling case for the need for archival
research as a means to gain a more precise understanding of speechwriting processes and products.
In chapter three, “Dwight D. Eisenhower: The 1954 State of the Union Address as a Case Study in Presidential
Speechwriting,” Charles J. G. Griffin investigates the speechwriting apparatus that supported Eisenhower's
presidential rhetoric. Ike's 1954 State of the Union Address provides an effective focus for this analysis.
Professor Griffin provides a meticulous description of the six‐month process of crafting this address, highlighting
contributions by a host of personnel and documenting the evolving philosophy behind this important address.
Griffin's study extends our knowledge of Eisenhower's flexible staffing system, the president's “hands on”
involvement in the writing process, and the “deliberate integration of speechwriting and policy‐making
activities” (74). Griffin argues that all three of these characteristics are representative of the way that the
Eisenhower White House approached presidential rhetorical responsibilities.
In chapter four, “John F. Kennedy: Presidential Speechwriting as Rhetorical Collaboration,” Theodore O. Windt,
Jr., maintains that “traditional approaches” to the study of speechwriting “are not particularly useful in the
Kennedy administration” (93). President Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen “wrote most of the major presidential
speeches” (93). On the question of exactly how much Kennedy contributed to the speechwriting, Windt
observes, “The truth of the matter seems to be that Kennedy got involved whenever he felt like getting
involved…. But that he was intimately involved in each of the major speeches and most of the others is
indisputable” (97). Ultimately, Kennedy's speechwriting operation is described as “freewheeling and ad hoc in
nature,” but it was a process that seemed to serve this president well.
In chapter five, “Lyndon B. Johnson: From Private Deliberations to Public Declaration—The Making of LBJ's
Renunciation Speech,” Moya Ann Ball explicates the historical context that led to LBJ's decision to announce his
intent not to run for reelection in 1968. According to Professor Ball, many of Johnson's speeches “resembled a
mosaic,” a complex combination of contributions from a variety of agents, agencies, ad hoc committees, and
major and minor speechwriters; “sometimes” LBJ's input was “rather minimal” (115). A number of power
struggles between the speechwriters vying for influence was often manifest. The result was that many speeches
tended to be the products of compromise; they were “bland, watered down,” and often bore little of the stamp
of the president's personality. The Johnson administration also sent out a confused and confusing message on
Vietnam. Professor Ball's careful analysis of the development of the March 31 address allows us an insider's view
of the slow transformation of a prototypical “war” speech into a newly polished “peace” initiative delivered in
the form of a public address.
In chapter six, “Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford: Lessons on Speechwriting,” Craig R. Smith, relying on his
special experience as a speechwriter for President Ford and on his extensive interviews with Nixon and Ford
speechwriters, concludes that President's Nixon's background as an orator and debater was an advantage in
later political life while President Ford's lack of oratorical training left him at a decided disadvantage. Professor

Craig argues that Nixon made use of extensive polling data to identify issues and formulate his stances. Ford's
carefully rehearsed nomination acceptance address contained more stylistic devices than his usual oratorical
efforts, and it also contained more “memorable lines” (142). His success with that speech affected how his
White House speech team operated during his relatively brief tenure in office. Professor Smith indicates that a
speechwriter's “influence with the president is a matter of luck, timing, effectiveness, and infighting” (146).
Smith's description of his own influence is an interesting case study in itself. Finally, Professor Smith argues that
presidential speechwriters need to be more concerned about the president's delivery and that one of their
duties should be to “coach performance.”
In chapter seven, “Jimmy Carter: The Language of Politics and the Practice of Integrity,” John H. Patton explores
a certain unresolved tension in President Carter's discourse. Carter had employed approximately 12
speechwriters during his tenure as president, and they seemed to operate on an ad hoc basis. In addition, they
had little direct access to the president, leaving the process rather fragmented and the speechwriters
themselves frustrated with a speech‐writing process divorced from the policy decision‐making process.
According to Professor Patton, the Carter speechwriting team was smaller than that of previous presidents “and,
more importantly, [it] was given scant resources” (169). When President Carter delivered policy addresses,
Patton argues, his “strong sense of humanity and spontaneity” was suppressed. This resulted in a policy speech
of “description and announcement” rather than “appeal and influence” (170). An exception to this set of
circumstances can be found in Carter's speeches on human rights policy and in ceremonial addresses where he
was able to expound on personal and public values. Carter was unable to resolve the tension between what
Professor Patton describes as “the programmatic language of description and the powerful personal rhetoric of
moral conviction” (188).
In chapter eight, “Ronald Reagan's Bully Pulpit: Creating a Rhetoric of Values,” William K. Muir, Jr., who worked
in the Reagan White House as a speechwriter for vice‐president George H. W. Bush, provides an excellent
overview of Reagan's speechwriters and the speech‐writing process. While acknowledging that Reagan was
perhaps at his best when delivering a ceremonial address, Muir's case study, a 1984 address to the National
League of Cities, demonstrates how well Reagan's speechwriters could work together to deliver a policy address.
Interestingly, this speech focused more on public philosophy than on specific policies for urban communities.
The principal speechwriter, Al Myer, helped to define Reagan's urban policy because, prior to the speech, it had
yet to be defined. Muir argues that throughout his presidency Ronald Reagan advanced his agenda based on
three philosophical “truths”: “social partnership, human imperfectability, and personal responsibility” (210).
Muir helps to illuminate Ronald Reagan's “moral” leadership and his study invites readers to “consider the moral
value of coherent presidential rhetoric” (213).
In the afterword, “Enduring Issues in Presidential Speechwriting,” Professor Medhurst comments on four key
themes raised by this collection: access to the president, the relation of speechwriting to policy making,
constraints on the speechwriting process, and finally, the relation of speechwriting and speechmaking to
presidential leadership. This discussion, although brief, is a useful way of tying the essays together and provides
common ground for future investigations.
In sum, this set of essays gives us a very fine, often intimate and revealing portrait of the presidential
speechwriting process; they also help us to account for the oratorical product in a more intelligent and
enlightened fashion, and they inescapably argue for the connection between and importance of presidential
words and deeds.

